I make brief extra comments in response to Lusk et al.

It is difficult comparing the poor cycle-specific facilities that I find in Northern Ireland with the lack of cycle-specific facilities typical in the US: neither scenario helps cyclists and any statements about which is to be preferred may never be more than impressionistic.

However, I would concede that even imperfect cycle-specific facilities provide publicity for the cause of cycle-commuting. Who knows: if poor facilities lever enough opprobrium among the community, the appropriate authorities may be pressured into acting to upgrade the facilites to something genuinely useful for cyclists.

In contrast, I guess the lack of any cycle-specific facilities typical of the US conveys the impression that urban and suburban cycling is nothing more than an extreme sport for young macho males - it is something to be outlawed if at all possible.

Conflict of Interest:

None declared

We agree with Reinhardt-Rutland's concerns1 about Northern Ireland's poorly designed and policed bicycle facilities but we doubt that the U.S. traditional model of simply treating bicycles as vehicles is better. What works is physically separating bicyclists from fast or heavy motor traffic. Reinhardt-Rutland further suggested that higher fuel costs could effect change where risk assessments have failed. While waiting for increases in fuel prices, we wanted to underscore the benefits of cycle tracks, including their lower injury risk.

Cycle tracks, as described and studied in our paper2 are physically- separated bicycle-exclusive paths along roads as found in the Netherlands. Cycle tracks can have dividers that prevent cars from parking on them. Parallel parked cars alongside a cycle track also separate bicyclists from moving traffic. These cycle tracks by parked cars can also lower exposure of cyclists to air pollution. Unlike a shared-use segregated path, pedestrians have a place on their sidewalk and bicyclists on their cycle track. With cycle tracks, drivers can see a space has been relegated in the right-of-way for bicyclists, especially when it comes with its own red and green bicycle signal.

The Montreal case shows that cycle tracks not only have lower injury risk2 but they may be an effective strategy for promoting cycling3 just by themselves or combined with other policies (ex. public bicycle share program, complete streets, etc.). When successful, drivers can witness women, children, seniors, and parents bicycling instead of mainly young, adult, male bicyclists in the road.

Reinhardt-Rutland wrote that the Northern Ireland's problematic bicycle facilities are often ineffective. By definition, non existent cycle tracks are also ineffective.

1. Reinhardt-Rutland TH. The effectiveness of dedicated cycling facilities: perceived and objective risk. Inj Prev 2011;17(3):216. 2. Lusk AC, Furth PG, Morency P, Miranda-Moreno LF, Willett WC, Dennerlein JT. Risk of injury for bicycling on cycle tracks versus in the street. Inj Prev 2011. 3. Miranda-Moreno LF. Weather or not to cycle: whether or not cyclist ridership has grown: a look at weather's impact on cycling facilities and temporal trends in an urban environment. Transportation Research Record in press.

Conflict of Interest:

None declared

The investigators did not meaningfully compare Relative Bicycling Risk and Relative Traffic Danger for individual pairs. Such a comparison of their data demonstrates that the Apparent Cycle Track Effect was increased Danger to bicyclists at two cycle tracks, Neutrality at two cycle tracks, and increased Safety at two cycle tracks. This contrasts with the investigators' claim that the six cycle tracks had a combined 28% lower injury rate than their eight reference streets.

But are the two cycle tracks that are apparently safer in actuality safer for bicycling than their reference streets? Examination reveals that this is false safety.

The investigators assumed, without testing or providing supporting evidence, that Motor Vehicle Occupant injury counts are a surrogate for traffic danger a bicyclist might face on a given street apart from any treatment. Examination of the street characters of Berri and reference Saint Denis show that MVO injuries are not a suitable surrogate for this pairing. I conclude that after adjustment for its reference street being inherently more dangerous for bicyclists, the Apparent Cycle Track Effect of Safety for Berri is instead Unknown.

The Apparent Cycle Track Effect of Safety for Christophe Colomb can be explained by an artificially low Relative Bicycling Risk compared to reference Saint Hubert, and an artificially high Relative Traffic Danger compared to reference Christoph Colomb non-cycle track section. After adjustments I conclude the Christophe Colomb cycle track has Neutrality with both its reference streets.

The reference streets in pairs 1, 3, and 6 are engineered to be more dangerous with the presence of "faux Door Zone Bike Lanes." Simple re- striping to eliminate this hazard and alert bicyclists to the extent of the door zone, and signage to empower them to use a full traffic lane could reduce bicyclist risk on these streets. This would make the cycle tracks comparatively more dangerous.

For my full critique, see: http://bicyclingmatters.wordpress.com/critiques/montreal-cycle-tracks/

Conflict of Interest:

None declared

Lusk et al's paper (1) indicates an important subtext regarding travel. Governments wish to make personal mobility as widely available as possible; this inevitably entails promotion of the private automobile, which can provide convenient and comfortable travel for the widest range of individuals, including those for whom disability would otherwise pose severe limitations in participating in society. However, there is a competing agenda concerning congestion, sustainability, pollution and health, along with the risk posed by automobiles for vulnerable road-users such as pedestrians and cyclists.

Authorities must strike a balance. In the case of the US, the balance generally favours the automobile: the insistence that cyclists be treated as "operators of vehicles" (2) underlines that assertion. Canada may be more bicycle-orientated. Lusk et al demonstrate that in Montreal segregated cycle tracks can entail fewer casualties than matched common- user roads: the consequent reduction in perceived and objective risk can sussessfully act to promote cycling.

0However, poorly designed and policed facilities may render the situation for cyclists worse than if the US model is followed. This is arguably the case in Northern Ireland. Cycle lanes at the side of roads are provided. Despite official prohibition, motor-vehicles frequently park or straddle cycle lanes before undertaking manoeuvres: junctions are particularly problematic regarding rights-of-way. Finally, cycle lanes are often well short of any meaningful journey. The official stance is that: "Use of cycle lanes is not compulsory and will depend on your experience and skills" (3). So cyclists are free to use other traffic lanes - but motorists seem unaware of this and often evince hostility towards cyclists exercising this freedom. The cyclist is uncomfortable on any part of the road - hardly a recipe for the development of mass cycle-commuting.

Segregated paths are also provided. These are in fact shared with pedestrians. Pedestrians no doubt provide better fellow travellers for cyclists than do automobiles, but the two groups are nevertheless incompatible regarding speed: cycling through groups of pedestrians or walking through streams of cyclists is not comfortable. Curiously, this is recognised regarding sidewalks, which are solely for pedestrians: cycling and driving are officially outlawed (3).

The above issues may reflect anomalous conceptualisations of risk. Northern Ireland again provides a useful example. The political conflict ("the Troubles") was always perceived to be particularly dangerous - for more so than the roads - as reflected in provision of manpower and resources. In fact, Northern Irish roads were objectively much riskier. Throughout the worst of the Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s, the objective risks of politically-motivated death and injury were about 50% and 12% respectively those for the roads (4). It is perhaps not surprising that strategies for promoting cycling are often ineffectual. With obvious exceptions such as the Netherlands, Denmark and - perhaps - Montreal, this unfortunately may apply in many jurisdictions.

Perhaps the seemingly inexorable increases in fuel cost may achieve real change: personal economics may win where conceptualisations of risk have failed.

References

1. Lusk A C, Furth P G, Morency P, et al. Risk of injury for bicycling on cycle tracks versus in the street. Inj Prev doi: 10.1136/ip.2010.028696.

2. Forrester J. Effective cycling. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984.

3. The Highway Code: AA Publishing, 2008.

4. Reinhardt-Rutland A H. Roadside speed-cameras: arguments for covert siting. Police J 2001; 74: 312-315.

Conflict of Interest:

None declared